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PRODUCT LIABILITY VERDICT
FORMULATION IN WISCONSIN
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PATRICK R. GRIFFIN***
I. INTRODUCTION
Our judicial system is presently experiencing a product lia-
bility revolution of massive proportions.' Ever increasing
quantities of time and energy are being invested in product
liability litigation and absent legislative intervention, the
trend is likely to continue. 2 In itself, this trend should not nec-
essarily be condemned, nor does this discussion advocate any
sort of restriction on the adjudication of product liability
claims. The increasing complexity that attends modem litiga-
tion does, however, impose a formidable and extremely chal-
lenging burden upon our judicial system. The response of the
judiciary and bar to this challenge has been commendable, but
much remains to be done.
Since Wisconsin's adoption of the theory of "strict" product
liability in the case of Dippel v. Sciano,3 a number of product
related trials involving the dual theories of negligence and
* L.L.B. 1960, Marquette University; partner with the law firm of Frisch, Dudek
and Slattery, Ltd.; member of the American Bar Association and State Bar of Wiscon-
sin.
** B.A. 1972, Syracuse University; J.D. 1975, University of Wisconsin; associate
with the law firm of Frisch, Dudek and Slattery, Ltd.; member of the American,
Wisconsin and Milwaukee Bar Associations.
B.B.A. 1975, University of Notre Dame; candidate for J.D. degree at Mar-
quette University Law School; member of the Marquette Law Review Board of Editors.
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUcT LIABiL-
ITY-FINAL REPORT, II-3 (1977).
2. Legislatures around the country are being flooded with proposals for modifica-
tions to our present system of compensating those injured by defective or unsafe
products. Id. at VII-1, 2.
3. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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strict liability have culminated with juries returning inconsist-
ent verdicts necessitating appellate review,4 retrial of the ac-
tion,' or both.' The primary cause of this verdict inconsistency
is the lack of agreement on the proper form of verdict to be used
in complex products litigation. It is the obligation of trial
judges and litigators to structure the special verdict in a way
that will eliminate or at least minimize the potential for incon-
sistent results. This article will examine the causes of tle prob-
lem and offer what the authors believe to be an appropriate
solution to the problem of inconsistent verdict results in dual
theory product liability actions.
II. CAUSES OF THE INCONSISTENCY PROBLEM
A. The Blurred Distinction Between Strict Liability and
Negligence
Although the strict product liability action is a creature of
comparatively recent origin,7 the law has long recognized a
cause of action for the negligent manufacture or sale of a prod-
uct,8 and for breach of an express or implied warranty relating
to a product The creation of the tort action in strict liability
4. See, e.g., Bjerk v. Universal Engineering Corp., 552 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1977);
Sterner v. United States Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1975);
Schuldies v. Service Machine Co., No. 72-619 (E.D. Wis., judgment entered May 3,
1977); Hansen v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 74-502 (E.D. Wis., judgment entered Mar.
18, 1977) appeal docketed, No. 77-1753 (7th Cir. 1977); Fisher v. Cleveland Punch &
Sheer Works Co., No. 417-603 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, judgment entered April 9,
1976) appeal docketed, No. 76-337 (Wis. S. Ct. 1976).
5. See, e.g., Sterner v. United States Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352
(8th Cir. 1975); Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 240 N.W.2d 303 (Minn.
1976).
6. Bjerk v. Universal Engineering Corp., 552 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1977).
7. The genesis of the strict products action sounding in tort can be traced to the
case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). How-
ever, it was not until the later case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), and the subsequent adoption by the
American Law Institute of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) that the
strict tort action, as we know it today, came into play. See Twerski, From Defect to
Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Products Liability Concepts, 60
MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Rethinking]; Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 804 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Prosser, Fall of the Citadel].
8. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); Blood Balm Co.
v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118 (1889); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am.
Dec. 455 (1852).
9. See Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 7, at 799-800. The warranty action
was originally an action in tort, based upon a breach of an assumed duty. The wrong
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resulted from judicial dissatisfaction with the difficulty of
proving a case under the negligence theory10 and the inability
of warranty law to provide an adequate remedy for those not
in privity with the defendant." The modern product liability
boom is the offspring of the strict liability concept as set forth
in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2
For the plaintiff, the primary advantage of proceeding
under section 402A is that it not only "relieves him of proving
specific acts of negligence. . ." on the part of a defendant, but
also frees him 3 from the warranty defenses of notice of breach,
disclaimer and lack of privity." Although the strict liability
action eases the plaintiff's burden of proof and allows for recov-
ery in a larger number of cases, many litigants shall choose to
proceed solely on the negligence theory, 5 or rely on alternative
theories of negligence and strict liability." This continued ad-
herence to the negligence theory in modern products liability
actions can best be attributed to several factors:
(1) In Wisconsin, comparative negligence concepts re-
quire trial counsel to deal with the extent of deviation from
an established standard of conduct (negligence) and/or prod-
uct danger (strict liability). Obviously, a plaintiffs position
is enhanced if he can broaden his criticism to include both
the defendant's conduct and the product;
(2) Most practitioners in the field have a much greater
familiarity with the negligence action type;
(3) Many trial attorneys feel that the negligence theory
is more easily understood by juries because it seeks to base
was considered to be a form of misrepresentation, similar to deceit, but not clearly
defined. Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 8 (1888).
10. See Note, "Unreasonable Danger" Eliminated From the Theory of Strict Lia-
bility-The Restatement Restated, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 943, 951 (1974); L. FLEmNG,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ToRTS, 95 (1967); Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without
Fault, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1422 (1966).
11. See Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 7, at 799-804.
12. Id. at 791-98.
13. According to WEBSTER'S THmD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY, 1041 (3d ed.
1961), the pronouns "he" and "his", despite their masculine connotation, may properly
be used to refer to indefinite objects or persons. Since the use of "he or she" or "his or
her" is awkward and consumes needless space, the writers use only one indefinite
pronoun to convey their meaning. It is hoped that use of this expedient will not offend
the readers' sensibilities.
14. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
15. See, e.g., Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).
16. See, e.g., Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976); Halvor-
son v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 240 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1976).
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liability on the defendant's fault while the strict liability doc-
trine requires that they determine liability by examining the
product without any consideration of the manufacturer's con-
duct;
(4) Some aspects of the rapidly developing body of strict
products liability law are still confusing and uncertain."
Increasingly, since the case of Howes v. Deere & Co., '8 the two
theories of liability have been asserted together, resulting in a
good deal of overlap in their development. The end result has
been a gradual blurring of the distinction between strict liabil-
ity and negligence. 9
This slow but perceptible merger of strict liability and neg-
ligence principles has served to heighten the potential for con-
fusion in dual theory products liability litigation.2 For exam-
ple, the highly respected Wisconsin Supreme Court has re-
cently experienced some difficulty in explaining the relation-
ship between strict tort liability and common law negligence .2
Indeed, in Howes the court conceded that "[i]t may be that
some of the difficulty in distinguishing the elements encom-
passed in the common-law negligence rule and the negligence
per se doctrine are attributable to the opinions of this court. ' 2
The Wisconsin court clearly does not stand alone in this regard.
It may be that some of the problems continuing to plague
the Wisconsin court are a natural incident of the manner in
which the doctrine of strict liability evolved and was assimi-
lated into existing tort law. Rather than conceptualize product
liability as an entirely new cause of action as some courts had
17. See W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 691 n. 5 (5th ed.
1971).
18. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
19. Perhaps the best illustration of this point is seen by comparing the "majority"
and "concurring" opinions in Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677
(1975). See also Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv.
325 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rheingold, Proof of Defect].
20. See Twerski, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 300.
21. See the concurring opinion of the late Chief Justice Hallows in Dippel v. Sci-
ano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 463, 155 N.W.2d 55, 65 (1967). See also Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis.
2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming
Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975); Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.,
64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974).
22. 71 Wis. 2d at 27, 238 N.W.2d at 80. Commentators on Wisconsin law have
expressed some doubt as to whether the Wisconsin negligence per se doctrine is really
a rule of strict liability. See Twerski, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 321-25; Note, Strict
Product Liability in Wisconsin, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 227.
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done, 23 Wisconsin chose to fit the concept within its existing
framework of highly sophisticated comparative negligence law.
This was accomplished by making a judicial determination
that, taken together, the elements of section 402A would be
treated as the equivalent of negligence per se.Y Clearly, strict
liability (negligence per se) focuses attention on the condition
of the product rather than the conduct of the defendant.25
Thus, under the ruling of Dippel, a manufacturer who causes
an injury by selling an unreasonably dangerous and defective
product which is expected to and does reach the ultimate con-
sumer without substantial change "is regarded by law as
negligent even though he has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of the product. '26
In the typical product injury action based on negligence
alone, it is the conduct of the defendant which serves as the
basis for liability. In such actions "[tihe plaintiff is simply
required to prove that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary
care and that the act or omission complained of was the cause,
in the legal sense, of the plaintiff's injury. 2 There is no ex-
plicit requirement that the plaintiff prove that the product, "s
marketed, contained an unreasonably dangerous defect.2
As simple as the foregoing proposition may sound, the ap-
plication of the principle to actual trial facts has proven to be
a source of endless trouble for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In Greiten v. LaD ow, 21 the court sharply divided over this very
issue: Is proof that a product is unreasonably dangerous a pre-
requisite to recovery in a product liability action based on the
theory of negligence?3 Justice Heffernan, in his "concurring"
opinion (later properly denominated the majority opinion)'
took the position that:
23. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 7, at 802-03.
24. Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 600, 235 N.W.2d 677, 684 (1975) (Heffernan,
J., concurring opinion); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461-62, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64
(1967); Twerski, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 319-20.
25. Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 275, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976).
26. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 3260 [emphasis added].
27. Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 601, 235 N.W.2d 677, 684 (1975).
28. Id. at 604, 235 N.W.2d at 684.
29. 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).
30. For critical discussions of the court's struggle in Greiten, see Twerski,
Rethinking, supra note 7, at 331-35, and Note, Strict Liability in Wisconsin, 1977 Wis.
L. REv. 227, 236-41.
31. Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 274, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976). See also
Twerski, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 322 n.65.
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Where a plaintiff proves negligence-in this case, the lack of
ordinary care in the design of a product-there is no doubt
that there may be recovery in the event the defective design
results in an unreasonably dangerous product, but there may
be recovery for the negligent design of a product even though
it is not unreasonably dangerous in the 402A sense. All that
is necessary to prove is that the product is designed with a
lack of ordinary care and that the lack of care resulted in
injury. No test of negligence has been called to the attention
of this writer that requires that the product be unreasonably
dangerous in order to predicate liability. 3
The words in the above quotation by Justice Heffernan are
quite clear. The point made is that the threshold question in a
negligent design product liability case is not whether the prod-
uct was unreasonably dangerous, but whether the defendant
failed to exercise ordinary care. In reaching the holding that the
plaintiff failed to adequately prove his case, however, Justice
Heffernan took a stance 180 degrees from the above-quoted
statement. "Accordingly, in the instant case, where the action
is grounded on negligence, it was necessary for the plaintiff to
show that the respondent LaDow, in the exercise of ordinary
care, should have foreseen that his design and method of instal-
lation would be unreasonably dangerous to others." 3
The apparent contradiction may, in part, stem from the
fact that Justice Heffernan did not expect his opinion to be
that of the court and, therefore, did not take pains to insure
that the opinion was free from potentially confusing dicta. Un-
fortunately, some members of the bench and bar have inter-
preted Justice Heffernan's opinion in Greiten far too literally,
thus detracting from the actual holding of the case.
Justice Robert Hansen, joined by two other members of the
court in his "majority" opinion (later denominated the concur-
ring opinion 4), sought to further merge the doctrines of strict
liability and negligence. Relying on a subsequently withdrawn 35
statement in Vincer v. Ester Williams All Aluminum Swim-
ming Pool Co.,3" Justice Hansen took the position that a plain-
tiff in a negligence products action must prove that the injury-
32. 70 Wis. 2d at 603, 235 N.W.2d at 685-86 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 602, 235 N.W.2d at 684 (emphasis added).
34. Howes v*. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 274, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976).
35. Id.
36. 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
[Vol. 61:381
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causing product was unreasonably dangerous. 37 He also held
that the determination of whether a product contains an unrea-
sonably dangerous defect depends on the reasonable expecta-
tions of the ordinary consumer conerning the characteristics of
the product.38
It is obvious that the members of the court in Greiten were
struggling with a problem of semantics. To date, the problem
has not been resolved. It was indeed surprising to see the Wis-
consin court, long the leading exponent on the law of negligence
in our country, go through such gyrations to determine whether
the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of negli-
gence. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the case is that
both the majority and concurring opinions correctly analyze
certain aspects of the problem but miss the mark entirely on
others.
Justice Heffernan's opinion in Greiten has recently been the
subject of considerable critical comment.39 Perhaps some of the
criticism would more properly be directed at those members of
the bench and bar who place undue emphasis on Justice Hef-
fernan's gratuitous statement that "there may be recovery for
negligent design of a product even though it is not unreasona-
bly dangerous in the 402A sense."40 Those who unduly empha-
size this dictum ignore the statement, which served as a focal
point for the case, that in a negligence action "it is necessary
to prove what was done and to prove what was done was fore-
seeably hazardous to someone."4 It is difficult to conceive in
theory or in practice how a product can be "foreseeably hazard-
ous" (i.e., a prerequisite to a finding of negligence) under cir-
cumstances where the product has been factually or legally
determined to be free of "unreasonable danger."
In several recent Wisconsin cases, both in state and federal
courts, where both strict liability and negligence inquiries were
submitted to the jury, verdicts were returned finding first that
37. 70 Wis. 2d 589, 596, 235 N.W.2d 677, 682 (1975).
38. Id.
39. See Twerski, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 331-35; and Note, Strict Liability in
Wisconsin, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 227, 236-41.
40. 70 Wis. 2d at 603, 235 N.W.2d at 685.
41. Id. at 602, 235 N.W.2d at 685. This becomes especially clear when one examines
those negligence product injury actions where the plaintiff relies on the res ipsa loqui-
tor inference. See Gierach v. Snap-On Tools, 79 Wis. 2d 47, 255 N.W.2d 465 (1977);
cf. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ripon Coop., 50 Wis. 2d 431, 184 N.W.2d 65 (1971) (jury
free to accept or reject inference of negligence from expert testimony).
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the product was not in a defective and unreasonably dangerous
condition, and, second, that its manufacture was causally neg-
ligent with respect to the plaintiff's injuries.12 Although such
verdict results clearly cannot be supported by reason or logic,
43
those who would literally read the majority opinion in Greiten
would find no inconsistency. Such an interpretation of the law
not only opens the door for verdict inconsistency, but encour-
ages it. The meaning of such inconsistent verdict results should
be clear from the analysis that follows. If a defendant failed to
act reasonably in the manufacture or design of a product, his
negligence must somehow be manifested in the resultant prod-
uct:
It simply will not do to state that the negligence which causes
harm is grounds for liability in a products case. The crucial
middle step cannot be eliminated in that negligence has to
result in a finding that some aspect of the product is below
acceptable quality, otherwise the negligence has simply
washed out into nothingness."
Insofar as Justice Hansen feels that the plaintiff in a prod-
ucts action. based on negligence must show that the product
was in some way unreasonably dangerous, he is correct in his
analysis.4" However, the requirement of proof of the dangerous
defect is more a matter of practicality than a black letter rule
of law. Sometimes the plaintiff will need to establish the unrea-
sonable danger only by implication. For instance, where the
plaintiff relies on a res ipsa loquitur inference to establish his
case, there is no explicit requirement that he prove that the
product was in a defective condition which was unreasonably
dangerous. Instead, it must only be shown that "(1) The event
in question [was] of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence; and (2) the agency or instrumental-
42. Schuldies v. Service Machine Co., No. 72-619 (E.D. Wis., judgment entered
May 3, 1977); Hansen v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 74-502 (E.D. Wis., judgment entered
Mar. 18, 1977) appeal docketed, No. 77-1753 (7th Cir. 1977); Fisher v. Cleveland Punch
& Sheer Works Co., No. 417-603 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, judgment entered April
9, 1976) appeal docketed, No. 76-337 (Wis. S. Ct. 1976).
43. Sterner v. United States Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 517 F.2d 1352, 1355
(8th Cir. 1975) (Henley, J., concurring); Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
240 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 1976); Twerski, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 332-33; Note,
Strict Liability in Wisconsin, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 227, 239-41.
44. Twerski, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 333.
45. See Rheingold, Proof of Defect, supra note 19, at 325; Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 836-37 (1973).
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ity causing the harm [was] within the exclusive control of the
defendant."", However, the basis of the liability imposed is that
there is some unreasonably dangerous quality of the product
which is not present in the typical product of its type, produced
without negligence on the part of the defendant.
An examination of the underpinnings of negligence liability
will reveal that a plaintiff in a standard negligence products
case will, in some fashion, have to establish that the product
was in an unreasonably dangerous condition. Negligence is, by
definition, the creation of an unreasonable risk of harm to oth-
ers.17 Liability is imposed if the defendant should have foreseen
that his design or method of production "would be unreasona-
bly dangerous to others." 8
Viewed from another perspective, the reasonableness of a
manufacturer's conduct in marketing the product is deter-
mined by balancing the utility of the product against the risk
or danger involved with its use." When the danger associated
with the use, manufacture or sale of the product is foreseeably
unreasonable, the manufacturer or seller is subject to liability
for the harm which results. If there is no unreasonable danger,
there should be no liability based on negligence. A manufac-
turer cannot be considered negligent for producing a safe prod-
uct.,0
Although it is likely that the court will have an opportunity
in the very near future, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not
yet been confronted with a case where the jury returned a ver-
dict absolving the defendant from strict liability, but never-
theless finding him negligent. This problem, however, was
squarely confronted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the
case of Halvorson v. American Hoist and Derrick Co.' This
46. Gierach v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 79 Wis. 2d 47, 53, 255 N.W.2d 465,467 (1977);
cf. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ripon Coop., 50 Wis. 2d 431, 436, 184 N.W.2d 65, 67 (1971)
(jury free to accept or reject inference of negligence from expert testimony).
47. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS, 145 (4th ed. 1971).
48. Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 602, 235 N.W.2d 677, 685 (1975).
49. Note, Strict Products Liability in Wisconsin, 1977 Wis. L. Rav. 227, 240.
50. Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 240 N.W.2d 303,307 (Minn. 1976);
Sterner v. United States Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352, 1355 (8th Cir.
1975) (Henley, J., concurring).
51. 240 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1976). Minnesota has adopted basically the same com-
parative negligence concepts and reading of section 402A as has Wisconsin. See MmN.
STAT. § 604.01 (1976); Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 239 N.W.2d 190 (Minn.
1976); Holkstead v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 288 Minn. 249, 180 N.W.2d 860
(1970); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
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case involved a situation where a crane boom struck an electric
wire and electrocuted the plaintiff who was attempting to
steady the load being held by the crane. The jury returned a
verdict, finding the crane manufacturer not strictly liable, but
went on to find the defendant negligent and ascribed twenty-
five percent of the causal negligence to the crane manufacturer
on proof that there was an absence of certain safety devices on
the crane. 5 The remaining seventy-five percent was appor-
tioned to the plaintiff's employer who had paid benefits under
the Minnesota Compensation Act. The pertinent questions on
the jury verdict with regard to strict liability and negligence
were phrased as follows:
Question Number 1:
At the time the truck crane left American Hoist and Der-
rick Co., was it in a defective condition, unreasonably dan-
gerous to a user of the crane, because of the absence of a
sensor device or insulated swivel?
Answer:
No.
Question Number 5:
Was American Hoist and Derrick Co. negligent in the
design, manufacture, inspection or testing of the crane?
Answer:
Yes.5
The Minnesota court, managing to avoid the semantic vor-
tex which troubled the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Greiten,
found that the verdict was clearly inconsistent.
The common element in both negligence and strict liability
theories of product liability is some kind of dangerous defect
rendering the product unreasonably dangerous for its in-
tended use. Unless such a dangerous defect can be found, our
previous cases would impliedly support a holding of no liabil-
ity as a matter of law.
Based on the above analysis, and under the facts of this case,
the jury's findings of no strict liability but 25 percent negli-
gence are inconsistent and irreconcilable. Implicit in the for-
mer finding is the conclusion that the crane was not a danger-
52. Plaintiff alleged that a sensor device which would sound a warning when the
boom approached a power line and an insulaulated hook were missing.
53. 240 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1976).
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ous, defective product because of the absence of safety de-
vices. Implicit in the latter finding is the contrary conclusion
that the crane created an unreasonable risk of harm because
of the absence of the same safety devices. These conclusions
cannot be reasonably reconciled. If a product is not dangerous
and defective in the absence of safety devices, it is not n~gli-
gent to manufacture it that way.54
The court went on to observe that normally such inconsistent
findings of a jury would result in a remand of the case for a new
trial. The proof in Halvorson, however, failed to establish lia-
bility under either theory as a matter of law, and the case was
therefore dismissed. 5
The logic and consistency of the Halvorson opinion is evi-
dent when compared with the opinion in Sterner v. U.S.
Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc.,"8 which reached a contrary
conclusion. There the jury, through its answers to special inter-
rogatories, found that the defendant manufacturer was not lia-
ble under a strict liability theory but was negligent. In this
case, which centered on the adequacy of flammability warnings
accompanying a can of all-purpose adhesive, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals briefly and unpersuasively found that
there was "no prejudicial error" in the verdict.
The jury's rejection of plaintiffs theory of strict liability as
to its defective product was not inconsistent with a finding
of negligence based on the inadequacy of the warning. The
jury could have rationally concluded the product was fit for
its intended use so long as the defendant properly warned its
users of the dangers involved.57
What the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to consider
was the fact that the absence of adequate label warnings in
itself constitutes a defect under section 402A, which, if unrea-
sonably dangerous, would subject the manufacturer to strict
liability in tort.58 If adequate warnings were not provided, the
54. Id. at 307 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 308.
56. 519 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1975).
57. Id. at 1354-55.
58. Id. at 1355 (Henley, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToaRTs § 402A,
Comment 1 (1965); Wis. J.I.-CIvIL No. 3262; Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal.
App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963). See also Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis.
2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974); Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Direc-
tions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L. J. 256 (1969).
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product was unreasonably dangerous under the definition of
section 402A.
The concurring opinion in Sterner pointed out the incon-
sistency of the verdict and the weakness of the majority's rea-
soning:
Common to both plaintiff's theories was his claim that the
[inadequate warnings] rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous or "defective." Since strict liability in tort is a
broader theory of liability than common law negligence in
that there may be a recovery on a strict liability theory with-
out a showing of negligence, the jury's finding for plaintiff on
the basis of his narrower negligence theory while refusing to
find for him on his broader theory was logically inconsistent,
and the inconsistency cannot be reconciled. 59
In this particular case, however, the concurrence did not call
for a new trial since there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding of strict liability by the jury."
It would appear that the reasoning of the Halvorson court
and the concurring opinion in Sterner correctly assess the prob-
lem. While the common law negligence doctrine and the theory
of strict product liability each have their own focus and termi-
nology, the ultimate question of each theory is whether the
defendant will be considered liable for his association with an
injury-producing product. The broader strict liability doctrine
establishes that a defendant will be liable if he produces an
"unreasonably dangerous" product even though there is an
absence of proof as to his specific conduct in the production of
that product. In contrast, the proof may go further and afford
a basis for criticizing the defendant's conduct in producing that
dangerous product and thus support a cause of action in negli-
gence. But to argue that a party's conduct in producing a prod-
uct which has been legally or factually determined to be safe
should be the occasion for attaching liability is wholly untena-
ble.6
59. 519 F.2d at 1355.
60. Id.
61. If the Wisconsin court's reasoning in Greiten is followed, it would seem that
the plaintiff in a negligence product liability case would not be required to prove that
the product was "defective." This view is equally unsound:
It becomes apparent from a study of the pertinent cases that a defect for
strict liability purposes is a defect for negligence purposes and warranty pur-
poses. The differences between the theories-if there is much today-must
therefore rest on factors other than the type and amount of proof required to
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B. The Inadequacy of Present Verdict Forms
In factually complicated and lengthy litigation special ver-
dicts should be constructed not only to comply with the dic-
tates of substantive law but should also be formulated to aid
the jury in understanding and deciding the case. A disservice
is done when jurors in dual theory product liability cases are
forced to decipher long and complicated melanges of questions
filled with unfamiliar jargon and technically confusing con-
cepts after receiving only a scant "crash course" in the same
legal principles which have troubled the bench and bar for a
number of years.62 If the legal profession has so complicated the
form of the modern jury verdict in dual theory product liability
actions that jurors cannot understand what they are doing, or
what they are supposed to be doing, then it becomes the profes-
sion's responsibility to provide an understandable form which
will eliminate the inconsistency problem and, at the same
time, facilitate a fair and just determination of all the issues.
In order to accomplish this, the bench and bar must identify
those matters which must be included in a jury submission and
present them in a concise and coherent form.
In any given case, a plaintiff may submit proof both critical
of the product (strict liability) and proof critical of the conduct
of the manufacturer in producing the product (negligence).
Under the rule laid down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Howes v. Deere & Co.,63 the trial court may then submit the
case to the jury on both theories of recovery.64 The submission
of the dual liability inquiries to the jury does not in itself in-
show that the product is defective.
Rheingold, Proof of Defect, supra note 19, at 325-26.
62. Professor Moore disfavors the special verdict form and advocates use of the
general verdict because:
Its chief value is that it applies the "law," oftentimes a body of technical and
refined theoretical principles and sometimes edged with harshness, in an earthy
fashion that comports with "justice" as conceived by the masses, for whom after
all the law is mainly meant to serve. The general verdict is the answer from the
man in the street.
5A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 49.05, at 2235-36 (2d ed. 1948). It is the opinion of
the authors that a simplified special verdict form, like the one proposed herein, pro-
vides many of the advantages of the general verdict-simplicity, understandability
and preservation of the jury function-while still retaining the beneficial features of
the special verdict.
63. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
64. The supreme court in Howes did not specify when both theories should be
submitted. Id. at 272, 238 N.W.2d at 79.
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crease the poential for verdict inconsistency. Rather, it is the
manner in which the two theories are presented that poten-
tiates inconsistent results. The Wisconsin Academy of Trial
Lawyers, appearing as amicus curiae in the Howes case, at-
tempted to clarify the matter while still retaining the plaintiff's
so-called "two kicks at the cat" by suggesting that the court
present first the negligence question and then the section
402A question in the verdict form. The supreme court, how-
ever, declined to deal with this issue, consigning the matter
instead to the discretion of the trial courts.
The brief of amicus curiae also suggests that we decide
whether the jury should be required to answer the negligence
question before approaching the negligence per se question.
At this stage in the development of the law in this state
relating to special liability of the seller, we decline to do so."
Whether the court's inaction was intended to encourage the
trial bar to develop a workable verdict format or an attempt to
avoid locking the trial courts and practicing bar into a rigid and
unworkable system is not particularly relevant. What is impor-
tant is that experience since Howes v. Deere & Co. has shown
that the verdict forms presently utilized are inadequate; for-
tunately, this experience has also indicated what the proper
approach should be.
It appears that most trial courts present both sets of inquir-
ies to the jury where the plaintiff has pleaded both theories of
liability, made a proper request at trial, and adduced some
credible evidence supporting each theory. Most courts then
submit two sets of questions to the jury: first, a 402A negligence
per se inquiry, followed by an ordinary negligence inquiry.
The leading commentary on verdict formulation in Wiscon-
sin, authored by the Honorable John A. Decker and John R.
Decker, indicates a preference for this order of submission
"because of the relative ease of proof of 402A negligence."" In
contrast to the Deckers, the authors of this article advocate a
more simplified form which employs only one broad negligence
inquiry to cover both bases of liability. If, however, two inquir-
ies are to made, it seems imperative to first inquire into the
common law negligence liability. This is so, despite any lan-
65. Id. See also Decker & Decker, Special Verdict Formulation in Wisconsin, 60
MARQ. L. REv. 201, 275 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Decker & Decker].
66. Decker & Decker, supra note 65, at 275, 290-94.
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guage to the contrary in Greiten, because a plaintiff who proves
an ordinary negligence product liability case will generally
have adduced sufficient evidence to support a negligence per
se verdict. 7 If the jury finds the defendant(s) negligent, it is
unnecessary to answer the 402A negligence question. If, on the
other hand, a jury finds no ordinary negligence on the part of
the defendant, it is still logically possible to find 402A negli-
gence due to the less demanding burden of proof of section
402A.68 Submitting the ordinary negligence inquiry first will, to
a degree, eliminate some of the potential for inconsistency as
it eradicates the danger that a verdict will be returned finding
a manufacturer negligent even though he has produced a safe
product. Even when structured in this fashion, however, the
multiple inquiry format is still unnecessarily complicated, and
does not achieve the optimum level of verdict performance.
The Decker article offers an "experimental" 69 verdict form
for use in dual theory products litigation which has served as
the model for most verdicts submitted in recent trials in this
67. Professor Keeton has written that:
[Wihile strict liability obviates the necessity for convincing the jury as to the
existence of negligence, it does not alter in any substantial way the plaintiff's
proof problems, and the satisfaction of plaintiff's proof requirements for strict
liability will generally result also in a finding of negligence. I cannot overem-
phasize this. In a products case the primary task of the plaintiff's lawyer is
establishing that the damaging event which occurred in the course of the use of
a product was the result of a defect and not due to some other cause such as
misuse.
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and
Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 563 (1969). Professor Wade concurs in
this view:
In the case of the improper design which makes the product dangerous, whatever
is enough to show that it is so dangerous that strict liability should apply (that
it has a "defective design," to use the Cronin approach), will also be enough to
show negligence on the part of the manufacturer. Even if the manufacturer is
not aware of the danger created by the bad design, he is negligent in not learning
of it. This is also true if the product is unsafe because it did not carry a suitable
warning or adequate instruction. The proof necessary to establish strict liability
will certainly be sufficient to establish negligence liability as well .... There
are thus innate similarities between the actions in negligence and in strict liabil-
ity, and changing the terminology does not alter this. [footnotes omitted].
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 836-37
(1973). See also Rheingold, Proof of Defect, supra note 19, at 325-26.
68. "[Strict liability in tort is a broader theory of liability than common law
negligence in that there may be a recovery on a strict liability theory without a showing
of negligence." Sterner v. United States Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d
1352, 1355 (8th Cir. 1975) (Henley, J., concurring).
69. Decker & Decker, supra note 65, at 290-94.
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state. The wide use of this "experimental" verdict form is un-
derstandable since the article was the first serious attempt to
address the subject. The experimental verdict form is quite
complete in that it painstakingly makes all relevant inquiries
and comparisons. Although the format is laudable for its com-
pleteness, and should be commended as the initial and most
thorough attempt to clarify this muddled segment of product
liability litigation, it has proven to be unsatisfactory in actual
practice.
Any multiple inquiry verdict is subject to an increased po-
tential for inconsistency. Placing the ordinary negligence in-
quiry first undoubtedly helps to alleviate this facet of the
problem, but other perplexing situations remain. The verdict
form proposed in the Decker article covers five pages and may
require more than twenty separate questions, many of them
long and confusing. Judging by what juries have indicated in
their attempts to respond to such verdicts,7" it appears that
this format is simply too complex to consistently elicit logically
coherent results. It is quite possible that many attorneys and
judges who have not thoroughly examined the Decker article
before using the suggested verdict form do not fully understand
its meaning and implications. What is required is a verdict
form which can be understood by an "average jury," as well as
by members of the legal profession, that can still be used on a
practical basis and result in internally consistent verdicts.
Ill. A PROPOSED VERDICT FORM FOR USE IN DUAL THEORY
PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
The proposed verdict format, which is set forth in the ap-
pendix to this article," only inquires into the negligence of each
person or entity who may be causally negligent or strictly liable
to the plaintiff. Each negligence inquiry is followed by a causa-
tion question to be answered if there is a finding of negligence.
The jury is then required to compare the negligence of all those
actors found to be causally involved. Finally, a standard dam-
age question is presented.
70. Schuldies v. Service Machine Co., No. 72-619 (E.D. Wis., judgment entered
May 3, 1977); Hensen v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 74-502 (E.D. Wis., judgment entered
Mar. 18, 1977) appeal docketed, No. 77-1753 (7th Cir. 1977); Fisher v. Cleveland
Punch & Sheer Works Co., No. 417-603 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, judgment entered
April 9, 1976) appeal docketed, No. 76-337 (Wis. S. Ct. 1976).
71. See APPENDIX, infra at 403-04.
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A critic's natural reaction at this point would be to argue
that Howes v. Deere & Co. requires that the case be submitted
to the jury on both theories of 402A and ordinary negligence
and, for this reason, the verdict format given in the appendix
is defective. As a matter of fact, however, the verdict is de-
signed to accommodate both 402A negligence per se and ordi-
nary negligence. The vehicle by which this is accomplished is
the jury instructions.
From Dippel v. Sciano to the present, the Wisconsin court
has consistently referred to these two theories of liability as
"two grounds of negligence" 2 and the jury is instructed in the
Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions that a manufacturer or seller
is "regarded as negligent" if the 402A elements are proved.13
Since the only focus of this portion of the verdict is to deter-
mine whether the defendant was negligent, whether that negli-
gence be "strict" or "traditional," there is no barrier, theoreti-
cal or otherwise, to a single inquiry format, 4 nor is there any
change required in the instructions proposed by the Wisconsin
Board of Circuit Judges. A similar single inquiry format is
commonly used, if not exclusively, in auto accident cases where
only one negligence question is asked per actor. The jury is
instructed that negligence includes a failure to exercise ordi-
nary care in the lookout, management, speed, and control of
the vehicle, as well as in any other relevant matters. 5
In the early development of Wisconsin law, "it was neces-
sary in a negligence action to submit separate questions con-
cerning each respect in which it was alleged that a party was
negligent provided there was credible evidence to support an
affirmative answer."" In 1961, however, the supreme court pro-
mulgated an amendment to the then existing special verdict
rule7 1 that authorized the use of the ultimate fact verdict.78
Thus, authority was delegated to the trial courts to structure
the verdict in such a manner that the sole inquiries would be
whether a particular defendant was negligent and whether such
72. See Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 272, 238 N.W.2d 76, 79 (1976).
73. WIs. J.I.-CIvIL No. 3260.
74. See Decker & Decker, supra note 65, at 278.
75. Id. at 245-46.
76. Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis. 2d 593, 597, 146 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1966). See Decker
& Decker, supra note 65, at 213.
77. Wis. STAT. § 270.27 (1959).
78. Supreme Court Order, 11 Wis. 2d v (effective June 1, 1961).
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negligence was causal. 9
In Baierl v. Hinshaw, the supreme court reflected on the use
of this streamlined verdict: "Wide use of the ultimate fact type
of verdict not only greatly simplified the form of special ver-
dicts submitted in negligence actions but also eliminated the
thorny problem of duplicitous findings of negligence which fre-
quently arose to plague both the trial courts and this court."80
The verdict proposed in the appendix similarly eliminates the
potential for inconsistency which arises when separate negli-
gence and negligence per se inquiries are made in the verdict.
Such an approach is explicitly authorized in the present
special verdict statute:
805.12 Special Verdicts. (1) Use. Unless it orders otherwise,
the court shall direct the jury to return a special verdict. The
verdict shall be prepared by the court in the form of written
questions relating only to material issues of ultimate facts
and admitting a direct answer. The jury shall answer in writ-
ing. In cases founded upon negligence, the court need not
submit separately any particular respect in which the party
was allegedly negligent. The court may also direct the jury to
find upon particular questions of fact.8
The proposed verdict format will also comport well with
established Wisconsin case law.8 2 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has long condemned lengthy verdicts which tend to con-
fuse the jury because of the inclusion of too many questions. 3
The court has also disapproved of individual inquiries
which are so long or complex that they are likely to be misun-
derstood by a jury.84 In criticizing one such verdict question,
the Wisconsin court stated, "it is so long and involved as to be
incomprehensible to a jury. It confuses rather than clarifies. A
verdict should be as short and simple in form as it is possible
to make it." 5
Admittedly, this admonition could be carried to an unwar-
ranted extreme in products liability litigation by further com-
79. Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis. 2d at 598, 146 N.W.2d at 435.
80. Id. at 598, 146 N.W.2d at 435-36.
81. WIS. STAT. § 805.12 (1975) (emphasis added).
82. See Decker & Decker, supra note 65, at 219-20.
83. Id. See also Okonski v. Pennsylvania & Ohio Fuel Co., 114 Wis. 448, 457, 90
N.W. 429, 432 (1902); Mauch v. City of Hartford, 112 Wis. 40, 53-67, 87 N.W. 816, 821-
25 (1901); Eberhardt v. Sanger, 51 Wis. 72, 8 N.W. 111 (1881).
84. Hoffman v. Regling, 217 Wis. 66, 70-73, 258 N.W. 347, 349-51 (1935).
85. Id. at 70, 258 N.W. at 349 (emphasis added).
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pressing the already reduced verdict form suggested in this
article. This could be done by combining the negligence and
causation questions. Although theoretically permissible,"6 it is
unlikely that either plaintiff's or defendant's counsel would be
willing to risk an appeal in order to determine whether such a
formulation is permissible. This is particularly so in light of the
fact that little or nothing is gained by combining the negligence
and causation questions since they are concepts readily under-
stood and easily dealt with by juries.
The concepts presented in this article are neither radically
new nor without support. The Decker article noted that
"present forms of special verdict and instructions are easily
adaptable to a single-question submission of 402A negligence
and ordinary negligence.""7 The Decker article would recom-
mend structuring such a verdict in a slightly different fashion
from that here proposed and would modify the instructions
given the jury. Although not harmful, such a modification is
unnecessary. The present Wisconsin Jury Instruction-Civil
Number 3260-states that a manufacturer is "regarded as neg-
ligent" if the elements of 402A are established.ss It will be suffi-
cient to introduce a simple jury instruction modification which
makes it clear that two separate standards are being used in
the jury verdict and that a finding of negligence under either
standard will suffice to make a determination of negligence on
the part of a defendant."9
It must be conceded that in some instances the answers to
the single negligence inquiry verdict proposed in this article
86. In Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis. 2d at 598, 146 N.W.2d at 436, the Wisconsin court
held that Wis. STAT. § 270.27 (1963), on which present Wis. STAT. § 805.12 (1975) is
"generally based," did not permit the use of a verdict which combined the negligence
and causation questions. However, the court ruled that it was not against public policy
for the parties to stipulate to its use. Id. at 601, 146 N.W.2d at 437. See Judicial Council
Committee's Note to Wis. STAT. § 805.12 printed at 67 Wis. 2d 703 (1975).
87. Decker & Decker, supra note 65, at 278.
88. WIs. J.I.-CvIL No. 3260.
89. A single instruction, combining the elements of present Wisconsin Jury Instruc-
tions-Civil, Numbers 3240 and 3260 would be sufficient. Essentially, the jury would
be instructed that a defendant is considered negligent, for example, if he fails to
exercise ordinary care in the design, warnings, instructions, or manufacture of a prod-
uct or if he sells a defective product which is unreasonably dangerous and which is
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold-even if he has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of the product. The jury would then be told that a finding under either
standard would require them to answer the negligence question with respect to the
defendant "yes."
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may not reveal whether common law negligence or negligence
per se was the basis for the jury's decision.9" This may become
a problem as a finding of negligence per se under the 402A
standard results in joint liability for all persons in the chain of
supply of the product for any damages awarded even though
the percentage of negligence ascribed to a particular defendant
is lower than that of the plaintiff.9 Fortunately, the answer to
this potential problem has already been analyzed in a concise
manner by the Decker article, and it is clear that no insur-
mountable hurdles are presented.
The liability to the injured person of a defendant, whether a
seller, distributor, manufacturer or component supplier, is
arrived at by different routes in negligence and strict liability
for torts, with "foreseeability of harm" being the route in the
first instance and "sale of a product in substantially the same
condition" in the second instance. Whether the liability of
persons in the chain of supply is to become joint is dependent
on the question whether each defendant is in the business of
selling the product and whether it reached the consumer in
substantially the same condition. In the ordinary case that
will be without dispute and thus there is no reason why the
"negligence" of the defendants cannot be determined as a
matter of law to be joint. However, if the evidence is in dis-
pute with respect to whether a defendant is in the chain of
supply, and that defendant is not found causally negligent,
the verdict will not determine whether he is in the chain of
supply and jointly liable. In such a case a special inquiry of
fact is required.92
A determination by the jury of causal negligence on the part
of all defendants in the chain of supply could obviate the prob-
lem. If there is a dispute as to whether the defendants are
jointly liable, it would be a simple matter to make special
inquiries of fact and require the jury to specify under which
theory of negligence they proceeded.9" Such an inquiry could be
extremely short, to the point, and would not unduly confuse or
complicate the verdict.
The proposed verdict also complies with the mandate of
90. See Decker & Decker, supra note 65, at 278.
91. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866
(1973).
92. Decker & Decker, supra note 65, at 278-79.
93. Id. at 278.
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City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales that the rights of
comparative contribution between defendants be determined
by the jury.94 In City of Franklin the trial court submitted a
verdict which required the jury only to compare the percentage
of causal negligence attributable to the defective product and
that of the plaintiff. 5 There was no comparison of the propor-
tionate amount of the product negligence ascribable to the in-
dividual defendants in the chain of supply. The supreme court
found that the trial court's verdict was inadequate because it
failed to provide a basis for determining the rights of contribu-
tion between defendants. To correct this deficiency, the court
remanded the case for a trial on the limited issue of the com-
parative negligence of the individual defendants. 6
There is nothing in City of Franklin which requires the
framing of a verdict so as to include two separate comparisons
of negligence, the first between plaintiff and "product," and
the second between the cabsal negligence of the defendants.
Although there is nothing improper about requiring the jury to
make two separate comparisons in the verdict form, it is unnec-
essary and undesirable.
The formulation proposed in this article provides a basis for
determining the rights of comparative contribution without
requiring an additional comparison question which could only
serve to increase the potential for jury confusion and verdict
inconsistency.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current products liability revolution has imposed upon
juries the burden of dealing with lengthy trials and extremely
complicated and technical issues. In past experience, juries
94. 58 Wis. 2d at 651-53, 207 N.W.2d at 871-72.
95. The verdict inquiry into the comparative causal negligence of the plaintiff and
the defendants read as follows:
Fifth Question: If you have answered both Question No. 1 and Question No.
2 "Yes," then such defect in construction constitutes causal negligence. If you
have answered "Yes" to Question No. 2 and "Yes" to either or both subdivisions
of Question No. 4, then answer this question; otherwise do not answer it:
Taking 100 percent as a total, what percentage of negligence do you attribute
to
(a) The defective condition of the wheel?
(b) The plaintiff, The City of Franklin?
Id. at 651, n.10, 207 N.W.2d at 871, n.10.
96. Id. at 657, 207 N.W.2d at 874.
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have responded to this task with diligence and fairness. In view
of the increasing numbers of product liability cases, however,
it is incumbent upon the legal profession to develop a simple
and straightforward verdict form that complies with the re-
quirements of established substantive law. While technology
may serve a public need as it becomes more complicated and
obscure, justice does not, and its administration should be
clear, concise and understood by all.
VERDICT FORMULATION
APPENDIX
Special Verdict
Question No. 1
Was the defendant, John Jones Manufacturing Company,
negligent with respect to the [insert name of product]?
Answer:
Question No. 2
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "yes," then answer this
question:
Was such negligence a cause of the plaintiff's injuries?
Answer:
Question No. 3
Was the defendant, Pete Smith Distributing Company,
negligent with respect to the [insert name of product]?
Answer:
Question No. 4
If your answer to Question No. 3 is "yes," then answer this
question:
Was such negligence a cause of the plaintiff's injuries?
Answer:
Question No. 5
Was the defendant, Mary Green Retail Selling Company,
negligent with respect to the [insert name of product]?
Answer:
Question No. 6
If your answer to Question No. 5 is "yes," then answer this
question:
Was such negligence a cause of the plaintiff's injuries?
Answer:
Question No. 7
At and immediately prior to his accident, was the plaintiff
negligent with respect to his own safety?
Answer:
Question No. 8
If your answer to Question No. 7 is "yes," then answer this
question:
Was such negligence a cause of his .injuries?
Answer:
Question No. 9
If you have found any two (or more) parties causally negli-
gent by answering "yes" to two (or more) of the Questions 2,
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4, 6 and/or 8, then answer the following questions on compara-
tive negligence:
Assuming the total negligence that caused plaintiff's inju-
ries to be 100%, what percentage thereof do you attribute to.
(a) John Jones Manufacturing Company?
Answer:
(b) Pete Smith Distributing Company?
Answer:
(c) Mary Green Retail Selling Company?
Answer:
(d) Plaintiff?
Answer:
Question No. 10
What sum of money will fairly and reasonably compensate
the plaintiff for:
(a) Past and future medical expenses?
Answer:
(b) Past and future loss of earning capacity?
Answer:
(c) Past and future pain, suffering and disability?
Answer:
Dissenting Jurors: Question Number:
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this day of
, 19-.
Foreperson
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